Populist radical right (PRR) parties are naturally Eurosceptic. Many responded positively to the British referendum vote to leave the European Union; various observers even spoke of a potential PRR-instigated 'domino effect'. We ask whether this Brexit-enthusiasm prevailed in the proximate aftermath of the UK referendum, by means of a comparative analysis of PRR parties' national election campaigns in the Netherlands, France, Germany and Italy. The analysis considers whether the UK referendum result served as an external stimulus for PRR parties to harden their Euroscepticism and politicise the issue of European integration. The results show that this has, generally speaking, not been the case, and that Brexit has also not stimulated or amplified calls for leaving the EU. Relating our findings to literature on the politicisation of European integration and strategic party behaviour, we argue that PRR parties had few incentives to act differently given the uninviting political opportunity structure.
Introduction
The UK's referendum of June 23 rd 2016 resulted in a narrow vote for leaving the European Union (EU). Eurosceptic parties across the continent either celebrated this 'Brexit' vote, or at least saw it as a necessary warning signal that the EU was in need of structural reform.
Several observers expected such parties to push for similar in-out referendums in other countries. One day after the Brexit vote, the British newspaper Telegraph (2016) published an article under the header 'EU faces Brexit "contagion" as populist parties across Europe call for referendums'. The Independent (2016) predicted that 'the British vote seems certain to make exit referendums a central issue in French and Dutch elections next year'. This article investigates whether Eurosceptic parties outside of Britain indeed treated the Brexit vote as an opportunity to bolster and emphasise their opposition to the EU. Our analysis specifically focuses on the most Eurosceptic party family: the populist radical right (PRR) . PRR parties oppose the EU for various reasons, yet previous studies have indicated that they are not united in the intensity of their Euroscepticism, and do not all (consistently) treat European integration as a core issue (Vasilopoulou, 2018; . This raises questions about the extent to which they treated the Brexit vote as an opportunity for mobilising support on the basis of a reinvigorated Eurosceptic agenda.
We study PRR parties in four founding EU member states across different parts of Western Europe (France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands). We ask whether they hardened their position on EU membership, and sought to politicise European integration, during national election campaigns in the aftermath of the Brexit vote. In doing so, we aim to contribute to knowledge about how, in the relatively short run, the Brexit process has affected other countries' domestic party competition (see also Adler-Nissen et al., 2017; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2018) . Our findings are also relevant to the more general literature on the politicisation of, and strategic party behaviour around, European integration.
We find that, despite having initially reacted to the referendum result with enthusiasm, the selected PRR parties shared a reluctance to prioritise EU membership, or European integration more generally, in their campaigns. They also did not converge around an appeal to follow the British example in leaving the EU. Notwithstanding variations in PRR parties' responses to Brexit, their appetite for politicising European integration was generally low already prior to the unfolding of the difficult negotiation process between the EU-27 and the UK.
In other words, the Brexit vote as such did not serve as a clear incentive for PRR parties to harden their positions or to politicise 'Europe'. We argue that most of them had few reasons to act differently, considering conditions related to their political opportunity structure.
Crucially, support for ending EU membership remained limited in our cases, issues related to European integration lacked genuine salience among voters, and PRR parties thus had good reasons to focus primarily on more tried-and-tested issues such as immigration and cultural change (Hoeglinger, 2016; McDonnell and Werner, 2018) . The difficulties in the Brexit process, which are likely to have further dampened public demand for leaving the EU elsewhere in Europe, have probably reduced the viability of a PRR 'exit strategy' also in the medium term. Whether most PRR parties will continue to shy away from a hard Eurosceptic strategy in the future depends, inter alia, on the (perceived) consequences of Brexit in the longer run (de Vries, 2017) .
The next sections proceed with a discussion, first, of PRR parties and European integration, and, second, of theories concerning the politicisation of European integration. Accordingly, we identify four sets of factors that may be expected to condition the responses of PRR parties to Brexit. We then explore these in each of our four case studies. In our final section, we offer a set of conclusions.
The PRR and European integration
The PRR has made electoral inroads since the start of the 1980s, witnessing increased electoral success during the past decade. Following Cas Mudde (2007) , parties of the PRR share a common core of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. What follows from this is an almost natural opposition to the process of European integration: the PRR typically portrays the EU as a project that threatens the sovereignty of the native people and, through the opening of borders, the cultural homogeneity of nations. Furthermore, the ostensibly complex and opaque European decision-making process is at odds with the populist nature of these parties, which favour the direct implementation of the popular will.
The PRR does not have a monopoly on Euroscepticism (e.g. Taggart, 1998; Halikiopoulou et al., 2012) . Radical left parties, for instance, oppose the EU for its supposed neoliberal character and free-market drive (e.g. de Vries and Edwards, 2009). PRR parties, nevertheless, are typically the strongest opponents of the EU in national party systems (Gómez-Reino and Llamazares, 2013) . Moreover, during the past decades there has been an increase of rightwing Euroscepticism, that is: opposition against the EU for reasons related to national interests, sovereignty, and identity (van Elsas and van der Brug, 2015) . These typical PRR themes also played a key role in the Brexit campaign, and the motivations of many voters who opted for 'Leave ' (e.g. Hobolt, 2016; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017) .
In addition, some PRR parties have taken a 'hard' Eurosceptic position, denoting an outright rejection of European integration and/or EU membership (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008) , which is currently rarely seen beyond this party family. The idea of following the UK's example in leaving the EU is therefore likely to appeal to PRR parties in particular. Seeing that it is possible to muster sufficient support to end EU membership, we would expect PRR parties across Europe to be the first to place the issue firmer on the political agenda. If they do not, this provides a clear indication that the UK referendum vote has not initiated a more general (hard) Eurosceptic wave across European party systems.
Brexit and the politicisation of European integration PRR responses in theory
We embed our study in the literature on politicisation of European integration, which has been operationalised as a multidimensional process involving a) increased salience of EU affairs; b) polarisation of positions and attitudes; and c) an expansion of actors and audiences (de Wilde et al. 2016) . We are specifically interested in whether the Brexit vote has stimulated PRR parties to contribute to EU politicisation by radicalising their positions on EU membership and increasing the salience of EU affairs. We thereby start out from the assumption that EU politicisation still largely occurs at the domestic level (Kriesi, 2016: 32) .
Scholars have accounted for (varying degrees of) politicisation by considering the EU's increasing political authority in combination with a variety of intermediating variables (such as competitive party politics, crises, or external shocks), which together form the political opportunity structure for EU politicisation (de Wilde and Zürn, 2012) . Grande and Hutter (2016a) , for instance, argue that two main sets of factors are driving forces of politicisation:
(1) critical events and (2) political actors and their mobilisation strategies.
Regarding the former, events and developments related to EU integration and membership are likely to increase attention to EU issues (Hutter et al., 2016) . To varying degrees, national referendums on EU issues, and debates about EU enlargement and Treaty reform have contributed to the politicisation of EU integration (Grande and Hutter, 2016b) . Brexit could be seen as another critical moment triggering intense debates over the EU: for the first time a country decided to depart from the EU. Furthermore, Brexit occurred when other crises (over immigration and the Eurozone) also hit the EU, together creating 'exceptional moments of politicisation' (Kriesi, 2016: 34) . Populist parties, in particular, have been argued to feed on, and actively perpetuate, real or perceived crises (Taggart 2000; Moffitt 2015) . The Brexit vote may thus have served as a 'focusing event' inducing PRR parties to politicise European integration (Pirro and Taggart 2018: 258) .
However, external critical events and crises are not sufficient to explain EU politicisation; one should also consider the interpretation and strategic deployment of these events by political actors. In relation to this, various scholars have argued that the politicisation of European integration has primarily been driven by Eurosceptic forces, not least political parties of the PRR (e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Hoeglinger, 2016; Kriesi, 2016) . If PRR parties were serious about their Euroscepticism, the Brexit vote ostensibly heralded the right moment for them to stimulate politicisation in their domestic contexts, and to problematise their country's EU membership. In our study, we thus assess whether the Brexit vote served as an 'external stimulus' (Harmel and Janda, 1994) for PRR parties to revitalise or intensify their opposition to the EU.
Besides describing PRR parties' responses to the Brexit vote, we also seek to tentatively explain such reactions. While it is generally assumed that PRR parties are key actors driving EU politicisation, we know little about the motivating mechanisms behind this. The Brexit process provides an exceptional case in point to explore how specific factors may hinder or stimulate EU politicisation by PRR parties. We investigate the assumption that the Brexit vote may have served as a general stimulus for EU politicisation, but argue that the behaviour of PRR parties is likely to be determined also by the specific opportunity structure they face.
While it is not our aim to test causal mechanisms or the relative impact of an exhaustive list of independent variables, we intend to explore the role of several potential explanatory conditions, which we identify on the basis of extant literature on party strategies and Euroscepticism.0 F 1 First, we expect public opinion towards EU membership to influence PRR reactions to Brexit. Political parties react to shifting opinions among their supporters or the public at large (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow et al., 2011) . As regards the EU issue, existing studies have shown that parties on the ideological fringes can be successful in gaining support on the basis of their Euroscepticism (e.g. de Vries, 2007; de Vries and Hobolt, 2012) . Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2016) , furthermore, found that growing public Euroscepticism in the wake of the financial crisis was met by a growth in Euroscepticism among 'extreme parties'. Interpreting 1 Pirro and van Kessel (2017) previously identified a set of four conditions to explain the EUpessimist stance of PRR parties. Two of these ('public opinion' and 'party competition') are discussed in this section. For this study, it has proven more fruitful to reconceptualise the third condition, 'leadership change', as 'internal party agreement'. The fourth, 'incumbency status', is left for the conclusion, given its limited empirical relevance in the period of study.
the Brexit vote as a new EU crisis, PRR parties may have been inclined to react in a similar way. However, given that the full consequences of Brexit were unknown, it may have been too early (and risky) for PRR parties to exploit the event electorally in the proximate aftermath. Particularly in cases where public opinion failed to shift in favour of leaving the EU, PRR parties may have felt discouraged to increase the prominence of EU issues or harden their Euroscepticism.
Second, we expect the public salience of European integration to influence PRR reactions to Brexit. Previous research has shown that PRR parties mainly mobilise support on the basis of their positions on 'cultural' issues (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2008; Spies, 2013) , more so than their Eurosceptic profile (Werts et al., 2013; McDonnell and Werner, 2018) . Seeing how the PRR has attained successes across European countries on the basis of salient issues such as immigration and multiculturalism, individual PRR parties may be inclined to stick to such a presumed winning strategy (see Hoeglinger, 2016) . Certainly when European integration remains secondary in the eyes of potential voters, PRR parties have few reasons to politicise EU-related issues.
Third, we expect strategic considerations related to party competition to influence PRR reactions to Brexit. In addition to reacting to public opinion, the strategic behaviour of parties is also influenced by the actions of their competitors (e.g. Meguid, 2008) . Parties on the ideological fringes have been argued to use European integration as an 'ideological crowbar' to put distance between themselves and mainstream parties (Taggart, 1998: 382) . De Vries and Hobolt (2012) have more recently shown how Euroscepticism can be a viable strategy for 'challenger parties' engaging in 'issue-entrepreneurship'. The EU issue can also be successfully used as a so-called 'wedge issue': increasing its salience may expose intra-party divisions over the issue among rivals and cause reputational damage . Then again, PRR parties may be less motivated to change course if they already are the most Eurosceptic forces in their respective party system. We therefore expect that Brexit may only act as a stimulus for politicisation or positional change in those contexts where PRR parties face competition from rival Eurosceptic parties, or where mainstream parties rivals adopt a clear Eurosceptic tone (Pirro and van Kessel, 2017) .
Finally, we expect internal party agreement (or lack thereof) on EU membership to influence PRR reactions to Brexit. Strategic party behaviour can be conditioned by intraparty dynamics (see Schumacher et al., 2013) . Not only do parties take into consideration positions and potential divisions among their voters (van de Wardt, 2014), they also want to avoid divisions within their organisation. A study of Steenbergen and Scott (2004) suggested that parties that are internally divided on Europe aim to de-emphasise the issue. This strategy will be successful insofar as the intensity of the internal dispute over EU issues is moderate and can be tamed by the party leadership (Hellström and Blomgren, 2016).
Analytical Approach
After describing PRR parties' immediate reactions to Brexit, our empirical analysis focuses on three main aspects. First, we look at the relative salience of Brexit and European integration in PRR parties' subsequent electoral campaigns. Second, we evaluate the parties' positions on these issues and their country's EU membership in particular, identifying three potential positions: 1) unconditional support for leaving the EU or an EU membership referendum; 2) conditional support for leaving the EU or an EU membership referendum; 3) no support for leaving the EU or an EU membership referendum. These positions are broadly in line with Vasilopoulou's (2018) framework on patterns of far right opposition to European integration, which distinguishes between 'rejectionist', 'conditional', and 'compromising' Euroscepticism, respectively. Third, exploring motivations underlying PRR party behaviour, we inform our comparative analysis of PRR party positions with our consideration of the four explanatory conditions as identified in the previous section.
We use a qualitative approach: we aimed not only at mapping PRR party positions, but also at exposing substantive arguments in order to provide an in-depth understanding of these parties' reactions to the Brexit vote. We focus on four different West European countries: the Netherlands, France, Germany and Italy; all founding members of the EU in which the PRR has achieved considerable electoral success (see Table 1 ). The main reason for selecting these cases is that they held national elections well within the first two years after the UK referendum vote, and within one year from each other. This allows us to judge whether PRR parties, during key electoral events in the relatively short aftermath of the Brexit vote, were stimulated to radicalise their positions and politicise European integration. In addition, we sought to secure sufficient geographical spread and variety in the lifespan of the selected PRRPs, including older (FN; LN), newer (PVV) and very young (AfD) PRR parties. For these reasons, and given the unavoidable trade-off between depth and breadth, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) -which competed in the October 2017 federal election -was excluded from the main study. Its position will be discussed briefly in the conclusion. Republic and Hungary). We chose to limit our analysis to Western Europe, in view of the low levels of EU politicisation and the general lack of partisan structuring of European integration in post-communist Europe (Hutter and Kriesi, 2019) . PRR parties here are not typical drivers of EU politicisation, and, while still soft-Eurosceptic, have also come to appreciate the benefits of EU membership and funding (see Pirro, 2015) . In our concluding section we will, however, briefly explain how our main observations also hold in other cases.
Our main sources across the four cases include 1) election manifestos; 2) articles and new items posted on party websites; and 3) televised election debates. With regard to all of these sources, we searched for references to Brexit as well as statements pertaining to parties' more general stance on European integration. In addition to these three main sources, we considered sources that are specifically relevant for each individual case and context.1 F 2 All such non-academic sources can be found in the Appendix. By relying on these combined sources, we ascertain that our interpretations of party positions are valid and accurate.
Findings
The Netherlands 
France
Not least due to the majoritarian electoral system, the Front National (now re-named Rassemblement National) has been a minor player in French parliament for most of its history. Yet in the two rounds of the French presidential elections, the party's leader, Marine Le Pen, received the highest vote shares ever for the party (21.3 and 33.9 per cent, respectively).
At the time of the UK's referendum, 'Mme Frexit' -as Le Pen was branded by the centreright newspaper Le Figaro -was unequivocal in her praise for Brexit, stressing that 'it was the beginning of a wider movement that would also take France' (Figaro, 2016 ; see also Monde, 2016) . Of the 42 news items posted on the party website during June 2016, thirteen were about Brexit. Le Pen portrayed the French as 'prisoners' of the EU and the euro, unlike the newly-emancipated British (FN, 2016a) . The Brexit vote had shown 'the face of true democracy' (FN, 2016b) . In an interview with TIME (2016) , 2016) . Given that her demands were highly unlikely to be agreed on by other EU members, this position came close to supporting an unconditional withdrawal.
In the period between the UK referendum and the French 2017 elections, she returned to the theme on various occasions. During a rally in Paris, Le Pen declared that her first measure as president of France would be to 'take back control' of the country's border by ending the Schengen agreement (see also FN, 2017) . Brexit was evoked on fewer occasions as the election drew closer. Only three of 103 online news items from March to June 2017 were devoted to Brexit, while 33 focused on immigration. However, EU membership remained at the forefront of the party's strategy, and the party initially retained its pledge to put EU membership to the people. In Le Pen's election manifesto, the very first commitment was to 'return to France its national sovereignty in a Europe of independent nations at the service of its peoples (Le Pen, 2017: 3). To this end, the document argued, 'a negotiation will be initiated with our European partners followed by a referendum on our membership of the 
Germany
The Alternative for Germany broke through at the federal level in the election of September 2017. Under the previous leadership of Bernd Lucke (2012 Lucke ( -2015 , the party was generally considered as a single-issue Eurosceptic party (Grimm, 2015; Havertz, 2018) ; after a leadership shift in July 2015, the party became a clear exponent of the PRR party family (Lees, 2018) .
During the days prior to the British referendum, the AfD welcomed the idea of Brexit; in fact, the co-lead candidate Alice Weidel raised the possibility of holding similar referendums across the EU, including in Germany (AfD, 2016a). The party executive moved away from this position in its post-Brexit statement on June 27 th , however, instead arguing more ambiguously that there was a 'need to rethink Europe' (AfD, 2016b). The referendum result was mainly represented as a symptom of the EU's deficiencies (AfD, 2016c), and a consequence of ill-advised policies at the federal and EU level, which had 'provided the British people with plenty of good arguments for Brexit' (AfD, 2016d) .
The issue practically disappeared as the federal election drew closer. In the AfD's election campaign, between June and September 2017, there were no mentions of Brexit in articles posted on the party website. The topic also remained unmentioned by Weidel during two TV debate appearances. Brexit did feature in the federal election manifesto, and the AfD outlined a consistent two-tiered strategy. In the first instance, the AfD demanded a redefinition and reorganisation of the EU as a confederation of sovereign states. Only if such a constellation proved impossible to agree on with EU partners, would Germany be 'forced to follow the example of Great Britain and withdraw from the existing EU' (AfD, 2017: 8) . Once again, the emphasis was laid on the ill-conceived politics of the EU and the German Altparteien (old parties), instead of signalling the putative benefits of exiting the EU, which was recursively portrayed as a last resort.
The manifesto also revealed that AfD adopted migration and cultural issues as primary elements of its discourse, and gradually disguised Eurosceptic claims. Whilst the federal election manifesto of 2013 still placed great emphasis on the EU and the euro-bailout policies, the edition of 2017 only counted three pages out of 76 dedicated exclusively to the Eurozone, referring only sporadically to the EU in more general terms (AfD, 2013; Lees, 2018) .
The subordination of EU issues to more central topics in the discourse of AfD was also evident during the election campaign. From June to September 2017, only 16 out of 244 articles posted on the party website focused on the EU, in contrast to 81 articles devoted to migration or the 'refugee crisis'.
As alluded to above, the AfD's reaction to Brexit should be understood in connection with the successive leadership changes in July 2015 and April 2017, which rebalanced the party orientation towards classic PRR topics. In contrast to the EU-centred discourses of the 'first'
AfD, the election in 2017 of Gauland and Weidel as key figureheads consolidated the party's turn towards national-conservative positions, and the marginalisation of its more moderateliberal wing (Lees, 2018; Havertz, 2018) .
Such a strategy seemed electorally prudent, considering that, following a study by the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, potential AfD voters exhibited a starker opposition to migration than to the EU (Hilmer et al., 2017: 37-40 criticism to the EU. Given its position as the only right-wing Eurosceptic party, as well as the other conditions pertaining to its opportunity structure, there were no incentives to AfD to harden or give more salience to its EU-opposition.
Italy
The Lega Nord (LN, the Northern League) has been analysed as a PRR party for around twenty years (e.g. Mudde, 2007) . Under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, LN devised a more nationalistic strategy -illustrated by the name change into 'Lega' prior to the 2018 electionand also toughened its Euroscepticism (Brunazzo and Gilbert, 2017) . In the 2014 elections for the European Parliament, the LN campaigned for an exit from the euro (LN, 2014: 15) .
In response to the Brexit vote, the LN hailed the British voters' decision as 'a great episode of freedom' (LN, 2016a) . Salvini tweeted that the 'heart, the mind and the pride [of the
British people] have defeated [Europe's] lies, threats and blackmails'. In a newspaper interview, he specified more precisely the desired implications of Brexit: 'I would like Italy to control again its borders, currency, banks, agriculture, trade and fisheries' (Repubblica, 2016 ). Yet, the LN did not advocate a complete withdrawal from the EU. Brexit was seen as the last 'sound of the bell' to reform and bring democracy to EU institutions (LN, 2016b). In the subsequent months, Brexit practically disappeared from the LN's political discourse.
Brexit also hardly played any role in the LN's strategy for the March 2018 elections. The LN ran as part of a centre-right coalition with three other parties, including the fellow right-wing Eurosceptic Fratelli d'Italia (FdI)2 F 3 and Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia. Brexit did not appear in the 12-page electoral programme of the coalition, while the lengthier (74-page) manifesto of the LN only made a few brief comments on the consequences of the UK's departure for EU politics. The party manifesto dedicated one section (out of 27) to the EUin addition to loose references to EU policies and institutions throughout. The LN intended to stay in the EU only if the pre-Maastricht order was to be restored, which showed that Brexit did not revert the post-2013 hardening of the LN's EU policy (cf. Brunazzo and Gilbert, 2017) . At the same time, however, the party did not unconditionally advocate an exit from the EU/Eurozone, or a referendum in these matters. The party also refrained from reviving its 'stop Euro' campaign that started in 2014. What is more, in terms of salience, immigration rather than Europe was at the forefront of the LN's political strategies. The party manifesto reserved thirteen per cent of its items to Europe and foreign policy, whereas law and order issues covered 40 per cent of the programme (Istituto Cattaneo, 2018 per cent, respectively (58 and 62 per cent of LN supporters). The best strategy for the LN's 2018 electoral campaign was to campaign on the basis of cultural issues: as a study showed, the first three optimal electoral issues for Lega were related to immigration, while leaving the euro and the EU were only the seventh and tenth optimal items, respectively (Emanuele and de Sio, 2008) .
Regarding the competition with other parties, the Lega was ostensibly well-placed to tap into Italian Euroscepticism. Mainstream parties (Partito Democratico and Forza Italia)
traditionally ran around EU-friendly or EU-neutral platforms. In addition, the LN often criticised the Five-Star Movement for their wavering positions on the EU (see e.g. LN, 2017).
For instance, Salvini condemned the reaction of M5S figurehead Beppe Grillo to Brexit for being prudent rather than jubilant and unabashed -thus presenting the LN as the genuine and the only consistently Eurosceptic party in the country (Corriere della Sera, 2016). On the other hand, the Lega was part of an electoral coalition with the more moderate Forza Italia, which, as was the case in the past, tied its hands to a certain extent. The electoral programme of the coalition was indeed less antagonistic towards (and detailed on) Europe than the LN's own manifesto.
Finally, internal party dynamics are unlikely to have prevented a fiercer Eurosceptic campaign. Although the LN has been based on delicate regional balances and was fraught in recent years with internal conflicts, the leadership of Salvini has appeared very secure (Repubblica, 2018b) . Significantly, no sizable disagreements on the post-2013 intensification of Euroscepticism emerged within the party. Vocal advocates of euro-exit, like Alberto
Bagnai and Claudio Borghi Aquilini, have recently ascended the party's ranks.
Discussion and Conclusion
The Brexit vote thus far failed to leave a lasting mark on the strategies of PRR parties across Europe. European integration did not feature prominently in the election campaigns of three of our four selected PRR parties (see Table 2 ). All of them questioned the merits of their country's EU membership, but they did not -with the possible exception of the French FNgenuinely seek to politicise the issue. In terms of their positions, three of the PRR parties studied ultimately shied away from unambiguously calling for a unilateral withdrawal, and typically argued that membership should only be revoked in case the EU failed to fundamentally reform -thereby essentially kicking the can down the road. The Dutch PVV already advocated a Dutch departure from the EU prior to the UK referendum, but notably turned the volume down on the issue in its most recent election campaign. There is, however, variation that is worth discussing, both in terms of PRR parties' stances and the conditions pertaining to their political opportunity structure (see Table 2 ). First, we find some support for the notion that PRR parties were unlikely to politicise EU issues when public opinion towards EU membership remained largely favourable. The Brexit vote has had little effect on public support for EU exits across our cases; if anything, support for staying in the EU has risen after the UK referendum. However, public attitudes are clearly not the sole motivator of party strategy: Geert Wilders's PVV has been hard-Eurosceptic since 2012, in a country with very limited support for leaving the EU. At the same time, the LN has remained soft-Eurosceptic despite the considerable public support for an Italian exit.
It is, therefore, also important to look at the salience of 'Europe'. In none of our selected cases was European integration considered the most salient issue by PRR supporters or the electorate at large. In line with previous research (Werts et al., 2013; McDonnell and Werner, 2018) , we found no indication that EU issues are of key importance to potential PRR voters.
Therefore, as long as PRR parties are successful by focusing on more tangible issues, not least those related to immigration and cultural change, their leaderships have little reason to take a risk and focus on themes that potentially divide their electorates or parties (e.g. van de Wardt, 2014 (Monde, 2019) .
Hoeglinger
Irrespective of continuing internal debates on German EU membership, the AfD also remained soft-Eurosceptic. In its EP election manifesto the party raised the option of 'Dexit', but qualified this as 'the last option' (AfD, 2019: 12) . The Dutch PVV and FvD, on the other hand, remained hard Eurosceptic. During the course of 2019, however, FvD downplayed its desire to leave the EU, which has been related to intra-party disagreements, the difficult Brexit process, as well as broad public support for EU membership (Trouw, 2019) .
Our general findings are likely to travel beyond our four cases. A more general survey of EU countries suggested that Brexit has had a minor impact on party-based Euroscepticism across the continent, and that, beyond the UK, Brexit is 'a rather distant and abstract process, with little apparent popular resonance' (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2018: 1207) . This was also apparent in the post-referendum national election campaigns in several other countries. In its 2017 campaign, the PRR Austrian Freedom Party refrained from following a hard-Eurosceptic trajectory, and discussed the EU at the very end of its manifesto (FPÖ, 2017) .
Brexit was a non-issue also in the 2017 Czech legislative elections, with no party seriously discussing any prospects of 'Czexit' (Kaniok, 2018) . Notwithstanding the explicit Eurosceptic discourse by the Fidesz-led government (Csehi, 2018) , both the parties Fidesz and Jobbik remained committed to EU membership. In the Swedish national election campaign of September 2018, the PRR Sweden Democrats showed little desire for a membership referendum (Braun, 2018) .
Our findings are consistent with previous studies indicating that the various crises the EU has faced in recent years may have incentivised PRR parties to (temporarily) amplify their general criticism of 'Europe', but less so to unambiguously harden their position (see . While the presence of PRR parties may certainly contribute to the politicisation of European integration at the party-system level (e.g. Dolezal and Hellström, 2016) , the issue does not always feature as a central element in those parties' electoral strategies. Although this remains speculative and hypothetical, a general shift of PRR parties towards hard Eurosceptic positions would probably require, most of all, an increase in salience of European integration issues and a concomitant rise in 'exit scepticism' among European citizens (see de Vries, 2018) .
There is no good reason, however, for PRR parties to drop their Euroscepticism, particularly since it links in with some of their key themes, such as national sovereignty, mistrust of elites, and resistance to opening borders and immigration. We predict that the more 'Europe'
can credibly be connected to such issues, the more salient it itself will become. What is more, if the consequences for the UK of leaving the EU turn out to be less dire than many expect, or if a political entrepreneur is able to formulate a convincing narrative about how to manage an exit from the EU more successfully, demands for more 'exit' referenda may well appear back on the 
